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Trusts often have the effect of undermining the social aims of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
In the absence of legislative action, the courts have been sympathetic to a range of arguments aimed 
at accessing trust assets that would have been subject to division between the parties but for the 
trust. None of these judicial responses adequately addresses the current deficiencies of the Property 
(Relationships) Act or the potential detriment to trusts and their beneficiaries. This paper considers 
a range of potential reforms and argues that any reform should seek to strike a balance between the 
social aims of a relationship property regime and the right of owners to structure their property 
interests as they wish. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
Trusts are very common in New Zealand, more so than in any other common law country it 
seems.1 When couples separate, assets acquired during the relationship or associated with it are 
often held in trust. But for the trust, some or all of those assets would be relationship property and 
subject to the equal sharing regime of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA). As these trusts 
are normally discretionary in nature, the parties to the relationship do not own the trust property. On 
trust law principles they have at most a hope or expectation that the trustees will exercise their 
discretion in favour of one or both of the parties to the relationship.2 As the PRA applies only to 
  
*  Professor of Law, University of Otago. I am grateful to academic and professional colleagues from around 
the country for engaging with me on this complex topic, especially Associate Professor Jessica Palmer. 
Thank you also to Andrew Snoddy JD, Research Assistant, Faculty of the Law, University of Otago, for 
locating relevant materials for this article. 
1  Law Commission Some Issues with the use of Trusts in New Zealand: Review of the Law of Trusts Second 
Issues Paper (NZLC IP20, 2010) at 2.1–2.7. 
2  Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 553 (HL) has been followed in Hunt v Muollo [2003] 
2 NZLR 322 (CA); Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 (CA); Kain v Hutton [2008] NZSC 61, [2008] 3 
NZLR 589; and in the PRA context Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA) at [148]. 
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property that is beneficially owned by either of the parties, property held in discretionary trusts3 is 
generally outside the scope of the PRA.4 Remedies for dealing with dispositions to trusts in ss 44 
and 44C of the PRA are limited in scope and do little to redress the exodus of assets from the PRA's 
reach. The courts also have power under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA) to make 
orders in relation to nuptial settlements, but that provision is available only to spouses and civil 
union partners, not de facto partners, and the court's discretion is not subject to the equal sharing 
principles that underpin the PRA. 
The detrimental effect of trusts on the relationship property rights of spouses and partners is 
well known, but the Legislature has done little so far to remedy the situation. The courts have been 
sympathetic to a range of arguments aimed at directly or indirectly accessing trust property in the 
context of a relationship dispute, but few have ultimately succeeded. A recent ruling of the Supreme 
Court that a husband's combination of powers in relation to a trust constituted "property" within the 
meaning of the PRA may reduce some of the frustration, but it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory 
answer in all cases.5 In the same case, but in a separate judgment, the Supreme Court also expanded 
the scope of the courts' jurisdiction and discretion in s 182 FPA, but it too will assist only some 
applicants.6 
In its Review of Trust Law, the New Zealand Law Commission recommended amending s 44C 
PRA and s 182 FPA to give the courts wider powers to make orders in respect of trusts, but it 
acknowledged that a full review of the PRA might be needed to address these matters properly.7 In 
November 2015 the Minister of Justice referred the PRA to the Law Commission for review. The 
terms of reference are broad, going well beyond the issue of trusts. This paper, however, will focus 
on the interface between relationship property law and trust law. 
The article will first briefly outline the current legal position to clarify the problem that trusts 
presently pose when dividing property on the breakdown of a relationship. It will then analyse the 
Law Commission's proposed reforms to s 44C PRA and s 182 FPA and their potential impact on 
three different types of trusts: a Couple's Trust settled by a couple with relationship property; a 
Single's Trust settled by a single person with property owned by that person, and a Parents' Trust 
  
3  The term "discretionary trust" is used here to include mere powers of appointment where trustees are not 
under a duty to distribute: McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (HL). 
4  See the definitions of "owner" and "property" in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2, discussed 
further below. See also Bill Atkin's discussion of the meaning of "property" in "What Kind of Property is 
'Relationship Property'?" (2016) 3 VUWLR 345. 
5  Clayton v Clayton [Vaughan Road Property Trust] [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 [Clayton VRPT 
(SC)]. The ruling is discussed further below and in Atkin, above n 4. 
6  Clayton v Clayton [Claymark Trust] [2016] NZSC 30, [2016] 1 NZLR 590 [Clayton CT (SC)]. 
7  Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts: A Trusts Act for New Zealand (NZLC R130, 2013) at ch 19. 
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settled by parents with assets from the parents to which the couple may or may not have contributed 
during the relationship. This analysis will reveal a number of concerns, particularly with the Law 
Commission's proposed reform to s 44C PRA. The article will then consider other, more radical, 
reforms that the Law Commission might propose in its review of the PRA and assess their potential 
consequences for the three types of trusts. I will argue that any reforms to the PRA and s 182 FPA 
should aim to strike a balance between the social objectives of a property sharing regime between 
former spouses and partners and the rights of property owners to structure their property interests as 
they wish and have those structures upheld. 
II CURRENT POSITION 
The current law governing property division between former spouses, civil union partners and 
de facto partners (spouses and partners) has its origin in the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. That 
Act introduced the idea of marriage being a partnership of equals to which each partner was 
presumed to contribute equally, albeit in different ways, and hence the principle of equal sharing of 
the property associated with the partnership on separation or divorce.8 The Matrimonial Property 
Act was amended in 2001 to strengthen the equal sharing regime, to include de facto relationships 
that had endured for more than three years, and to extend the regime to relationships ending on 
death.9 The Act was renamed the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, but the essence of the equal 
sharing regime was not changed.10 
During the relationship, each party is free to deal with his or her assets as he or she wishes.11 
But on separation the assets that each party beneficially owns are classified as either relationship 
property or separate property. Relationship property is equally shared subject to limited exceptions, 
while separate property is retained by the owning spouse, subject to any compensation orders the 
court may make in favour of the non-owning spouse or partner. 12  Relationship property is 
exhaustively defined in the PRA.13 It captures the assets produced by the partnership, including any 
  
8  Matrimonial Property Act 1976, long title. Contributions of a monetary nature are presumed to be of no 
greater value than contributions of a non-monetary nature: s 18. 
9  Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001. Most of the amended Act came into force on 1 February 
2002. 
10  Although some of the section numbers have changed, references here are to the Property (Relationships) 
Act, rather than the Matrimonial Property Act. 
11  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 19. 
12  Sections 11–14AA. The two exceptions to equal division of relationship property are relationships of less 
than three years duration (ss 14–14AA) and where extraordinary circumstances exist that make equal 
sharing repugnant to justice (s 13). Compensation may be ordered inter alia for economic disparity (s 15), 
sustaining separate property (s 17), and dispositions having the effect of defeating the applicant's rights (s 
44C). 
13  Sections 8–10. 
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increase in value of separate property attributable to the application of relationship property or the 
direct or indirect actions of the non-owning spouse or partner, as well as the family home and family 
chattels whenever they were acquired.14 Property acquired during the marriage from a third party by 
way of gift, inheritance, survivorship, or as a beneficiary of a trust is not produced by the joint 
efforts of the spouses and hence is separate property of the owning spouse.15  The regime is 
essentially a deferred community property system.16 It applies unless the parties formally contract 
out of the PRA.17  
A  The PRA and Trusts 
1 Meaning of property ownership 
The most common form of trust in New Zealand is a discretionary family trust, often settled by 
one or both of the parties to a marriage, civil union, or de facto relationship, for the benefit of 
themselves and their children. As distribution from such a trust is at the discretion of the trustees, 
the conventional view is that the objects of the trust do not beneficially own the assets of the trust 
prior to distribution in their favour.18 The PRA defines "owner" as "the beneficial owner of the 
property under any enactment or rule of common law or equity".19 The trust assets are therefore not 
property of the parties for purposes of the PRA, even if but for the trust the assets would be 
relationship property.  
The courts have entertained a range of arguments aimed at bringing trust assets or the settlor's 
powers in relation to the trust within the PRA's meaning of property. "Property" is defined as 
including real and personal property, any estate or interest in real or personal property, any debt or 
thing in action, and any other right or interest.20 Prior to the recent Supreme Court ruling in Clayton 
v Clayton in relation to the Vaughan Road Property Trust (Clayton VRPT), arguments to bring trust 
assets or powers within this definition have generally been unsuccessful.21 The sham argument 
usually fails because the trust deed was not intended to be a pretence or façade to conceal the true 
  
14  Sections 8 and 9A. The family home and chattels are included because of their close association with the 
marriage relationship.  
15  Section 10.  
16  AH Angelo and WR Atkin "A Conceptual and Structural Overview of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976" 
(1977) 7 NZULR 237. 
17  Property (Relationships) Act, s 21. 
18  Hunt v Muollo, above n 2, at [11]; Johns v Johns, above n 2, at [31]; Kain v Hutton, above n 2, at [25]; and 
in the PRA context Nation v Nation, above n 2, at [74]. 
19  Property (Relationships) Act, s 2. 
20  Property (Relationships) Act, s 2. 
21  Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5. 
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intentions of the settlor and trustees.22 The settlor normally intends to create a trust.23 The argument 
that the settlor's retention of extensive powers of control should result in the trust being disregarded 
as illusory or as the settlor's "alter ego" were rejected as flawed arguments. In Official Assignee v 
Wilson the Court of Appeal held that the alter ego argument was not a separate cause of action.24 It 
could at most be used as evidence of a sham or some other established cause of action. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the illusory trust argument in Clayton v Clayton as being no different from the sham 
argument.25 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court opined that the absence of a sham did not 
necessarily preclude a finding that no trust came into existence if the settlor had such extensive 
powers over the trust that the property could not be said to have been alienated in favour of 
another.26 It preferred to label such trusts as simply invalid rather than "illusory".27 While this 
argument thus remains viable, there are likely to be few cases where the settlor has retained such 
extensive powers over the trust that no trust came into existence. 
Arguments that retained powers of control in conjunction with a discretionary interest constitute 
property have had greater success.28 These arguments do not purport to access the trust assets 
directly, but to give those powers independent value. 29  While these arguments, known as the 
  
22  Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289 
at [33]; and Official Assignee v Wilson [2008] NZCA 122, [2008] 3 NZLR 45. In KA No 4 Trustee Ltd v 
Financial Markets Authority [2012] NZCA 370 at [52] the Court of Appeal did not appear to require 
fraudulent concealment. It saw merit in the argument that the retention of extensive of powers of control in 
the hands of one person may suffice to establish a sham. 
23  As in the case of the Vaughan Road Property Trust settled by Mr Clayton, which all of the courts agreed 
was not a sham because Mr Clayton genuinely intended to create a trust: MAC v MAC FC Rotorua FAM-
2007-063-652, 2 December 2011 at [67]; Clayton v Clayton [2013] NZHC 301, [2013] 3 NZLR 236 at [79]; 
Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZCA 30, [2015] 3 NZLR 293 [Clayton (CA)] at [67]; and Clayton VRPT (SC), 
above n 5, at [117]. None of the courts relied on the dictum in KA No 4 Trustee Ltd v Financial Markets 
Authority, above n 22. 
24  Official Assignee v Wilson, above n 22, at [72]. See also Jessica Palmer "Dealing with the emerging 
popularity of sham trusts" [2007] NZ L Rev 81; and Jessica Palmer "Controlling the trust" (2011) 12 OLR 
473. 
25  Clayton (CA), above n 23, at [57]–[85]. See Jessica Palmer and Nicola Peart "Clayton v Clayton: a step too 
far?" (2015) NZFLJ 114, where this ruling is criticised. The decision also received international criticism: 
Joel Nitikman "Sham, illusion and all that jazz: a case comment on Clayton v Clayton" (2016) 22 Trusts and 
Trustees 180–189.  
26  Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5, at [123]–[124]. 
27  At [123]. 
28  JG v JBG FC North Shore FAM-2007-044-591, 13 July 2010; R v R [2010] NZFLR 555 (FC); and LTEP v 
JMP (A Bankrupt) [2011] NZFLR 797 (FC). 
29  In Walker v Walker [2007] NZCA 30, [2007] NZFLR 772 at [49] the Court of Appeal commented obiter 
that rights and powers associated with a trust were a valuable "package of assets", because together they 
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"bundle of rights" or "package of assets" argument, have been the subject of widespread criticism,30 
the Supreme Court adopted a more sophisticated version of that argument in Clayton VRPT in 
relation to the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT), one of many trusts associated with Mr 
Clayton's sawmilling business.31  
Mr Clayton settled the VRPT in 1999 during his marriage with assets mostly accumulated 
during his marriage.32 He was the sole trustee and he, his wife, and their children were discretionary 
beneficiaries.33 The children were the final beneficiaries.34 In his capacity as Principal Family 
Member 35  Mr Clayton had the power to appoint and remove trustees 36  and discretionary 
beneficiaries,37 but not final beneficiaries.38 As trustee he had the power to appoint capital and 
income to any of the discretionary beneficiaries during the existence of the trust and on vesting 
day.39 He also had the power to bring the vesting date forward,40 and to resettle all or any part of the 
  
conferred control over the company that operated the husband's business. See also Harrison v Harrison 
[2009] NZCA 68, [2009] NZFLR 687. 
30  For example Paul Heath "Some Thoughts on a (New Zealand) Judicial Approach to Trust Law" (Address to 
STEP New Zealand Conference, 29 March 2012); Anthony Grant "Might the Bundle of Rights Theory 
Emerge in Another Form?" (2012) 190 NZ Lawyer 13; Shelley Griffiths, "Valuing 'Bundles of Rights' for 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: when neither art nor science is enough" (2011) 7 NZFLJ 98; Mark 
O'Regan and Andrew Butler "Equity and Trusts in a Family Law Context" (paper presented to the New 
Zealand Law Society Family Law Conference, November 2011) 267; Palmer "Dealing with the emerging 
popularity of sham trusts", above n 24; Palmer "Controlling the trust", above n 24; and Charles Rickett 
"Instrumentalism in the Law of Trusts – The Disturbing Case of the Constructive Trust Upon an Express 
Trust" (2016) VUWLR 463. But see Frances Gush "The 'Bundle of Rights' – Unravelling Trust Principles" 
(2012) 7 NZFLJ 157. 
31  Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5. 
32  Relevant clauses of the Vaughan Road Property Trust Deed [VRPT] are appended to the Supreme Court 
decision. 
33  Clause 2.1. 
34  Clause 2.1. 
35  Clause 2.1. 
36  Clause 17. 
37  Clause 7.1. 
38  The Court of Appeal was in error in thinking that Mr Clayton had the power to remove all the beneficiaries 
leaving himself as the sole beneficiary and, as he was the sole trustee, thereby bring the trust to an end: 
Clayton (CA), above n 23, at [88]. The Court of Appeal was therefore wrong to conclude that the power to 
add and remove beneficiaries on its own gave Mr Clayton a general power of appointment and the Supreme 
Court overruled the Court of Appeal on this point: Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5 at [49]. For a critical 
analysis of the Court of Appeal decision see Palmer and Peart, above n 25. 
39  VRPT, above n 32, at cls 4.1, 6.1 and 10. 
40  Clause 2.1, definition of "vesting day". 
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trust fund in favour of any one or more discretionary beneficiaries.41 Furthermore, and unusually, he 
had the power as trustee to exercise any of the powers and discretions in his own favour.42 As is 
common in discretionary trusts, the VRPT deed excluded several of the default duties that would 
otherwise constrain the trustee's exercise of powers. As trustee, Mr Clayton had unfettered 
discretion to exercise the powers and discretions partially, without considering the interests of all 
beneficiaries and regardless of whether the exercise might be contrary to the interests of any present 
or future beneficiary.43 There was also a clause negating a trustee's conflict of interest, which 
allowed him to exercise any of the powers and discretions notwithstanding that his interests or duty 
might conflict with his duty to the trust fund or any beneficiary.44  
The Supreme Court held that this combination of powers and entitlements gave Mr Clayton such 
a degree of control over the assets of the VRPT that it was appropriate to classify the powers as 
rights or interest in terms of the definition of "property" in the PRA.45 The combination of powers 
constituted a general power of appointment, because he could exercise them in his own favour 
without having to consider the interests of other beneficiaries.46 The freedom to self-benefit, and the 
exclusion of default duties meant there was "no effective constraint on the exercise of powers in 
favour of himself".47 The normal constraints of fiduciary obligations are "not of any practical 
significance" in relation to his powers as trustee.48 As this power was acquired during the marriage, 
it was relationship property under s 8(1)(e) PRA and subject to equal division.49 The power was 
valued as equal to the value of the trust assets and, hence, the effect was that Mrs Clayton was 
entitled to half the value of the VRPT assets as her relationship property entitlement. 
Space does not permit a detailed analysis of this decision, except to observe that if Mr Clayton 
could not be held accountable for the exercise of his powers, as the Supreme Court suggests, a core 
  
41  Clause 8.1. 
42  Clause 14.1: "A Trustee who is also a Beneficiary may exercise any power or discretion vested in the 
Trustees in his, her, or its favour." 
43  Clause 11.1. 
44  Clause 19.1(c). 
45  Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5, at [80]. 
46  At [59]–[68]. The Court observed that this was a more compelling case to treat powers and entitlements in 
relation to a trust as property than the Australian case of Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 56, (2008) 238 CLR 
366, decided under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
47  Clayton VRPT (SC), above n 5, at [67]. 
48  At [64]. 
49  At [86]. There was no evidence that assets in the VRPT would have been separate property, but for the trust. 
If there had been, the Court said at [89] that it might have been necessary to consider invoking the exception 
to equal division in s 13 of the Act. 
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element of a trust was missing and the Court should have concluded that the trust was invalid, rather 
than treating the powers as property. Either way, this decision creates significant uncertainty for 
other trusts. The VRPT was unusual in the extent of the powers and all of them being held by one 
person: Mr Clayton. What if the settlor's powers were less extensive? The Court left that question 
for another day.50 However, it did indicate the need for "worldly realism" in the PRA context and an 
acceptance that strict concepts of property law may not be appropriate in this context.51 This 
comment is likely to encourage a broad application of the ruling in future cases, which may 
substantially redress the undermining effect of trusts on relationship property claims. Nonetheless, it 
is unlikely to provide an adequate response in all cases.52 
2 Remedies under the PRA 
When the Matrimonial Property Act (MPA) was adopted in 1976, s 44 gave the court the power 
to set aside dispositions made to defeat a spouse's rights under the MPA. While a "disposition" was 
broadly interpreted,53 proving the required defeating intent was notoriously difficult, because the 
applicant had to establish a fraudulent motive.54 The intent requirement still imposes a hefty burden 
on applicants, even though there is no longer a need to establish a fraudulent motive. In Regal 
Castings v Lightbody the Supreme Court held, in a different but similarly worded context, that a 
defeating intent exists if the transferor knew or must have known that the disposition would, or was 
likely to, defeat the applicant's rights.55 That test has since been applied to s 44.56 While the 
knowledge test makes it a little easier to establish a defeating intent, this requirement still constrains 
the usefulness of this remedy.  
A Ministerial Working Group, established in 1988, identified the defeating effect of trusts on the 
MPA's equal sharing regime and proposed amendments to the MPA that included giving the courts 
  
50  At n 81. 
51  At [79].  
52  The reasonable expectation test, developed in Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327 (CA) and Lankow v Rose 
[1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA), is also sometimes invoked in support of a constructive trust claim to a share of 
the beneficial ownership of trust assets: Clark v Clark [2012] NZHC 3159, [2013] NZFLR 534; Murrell v 
Hamilton [2014] NZCA 377; and MJK v HBTCL [2014] NZHC 3298. The fundamental flaws in these 
arguments are discussed by Rickett, above n 30. 
53  It includes all forms of alienation whether for value or not, and regardless of the status of the property and 
regardless of who disposes of the property: Re Polkinghorne Trust (1988) 3 FRNZ 636 (HC). 
54  Coles v Coles (1987) 3 FRNZ 101 (CA), where the Court of Appeal ruled that the applicant had to show a 
conscious desire to put the property beyond the court's reach. 
55  Regal Castings Ltd v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87, [2009] 2 NZLR 433, which concerned the power to set 
aside fraudulent dispositions under s 60 of the Property Law Act 1952. 
56  Ryan v Unkovich [2010] 1 NZLR 434 (HC) at [33]; Patterson v Davison [2012] NZHC 2757; Gray v Gray 
[2013] NZHC 2890; and SMW v MC [2013] NZHC 396, [2014] NZFLR 71. 
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the power to make orders against the capital of the trust to compensate for the loss of relationship 
property. Section 44C of the PRA, inserted as part of the regime’s 2001 reforms, went some way to 
implementing the Working Group's recommendations, but stopped short of giving the courts power 
to make orders against the trust capital. That was intentional, because "trusts are created for 
legitimate reasons and should be permitted to fulfill that purpose, where there was no intention to 
defeat the spouse's claim at the time the trust was established".57 
Section 44C empowers the court to order the respondent spouse or partner to compensate the 
applicant if either or both of them have disposed of relationship property to a trust since the 
relationship began and the disposition has the effect of defeating the rights of one of the spouses or 
partners under the PRA and s 44 is not available. The purpose of s 44C is to remedy the unequal 
effect of a disposition of relationship property. If both parties are equally affected by the disposition, 
there is no reason or justification to order one party to compensate the other. If the jurisdictional 
requirements are met, the court may order the other spouse or partner to pay a sum of money or 
transfer property from his or her separate property or relationship property.58 If there is insufficient 
property outside the trust, the court may order the trustees to pay income from the trust to the spouse 
or partner whose rights have been defeated by the disposition.59 The court cannot make an order 
against the trustees if a third person has in good faith altered their position in reliance on the ability 
of the trustees to distribute income under the trust and it would be unjust to make the order.60 
Section 44C has not provided the much anticipated relief to disadvantaged spouses and partners. 
Its jurisdictional requirements provide only a narrow gateway into its compensation powers. 
Property transferred into trust prior to the start of the relationship or separate property of the owning 
spouse or partner is excluded, even if subsequently such property or its increase in value would have 
become relationship property. For example, if the family home was transferred into trust before the 
relationship began, the court has no jurisdiction to order compensation.61 Property transferred into 
trust by third parties, such as a third party vendor of the property or the parents of a spouse or 
partner, is not within the section's scope either.62 
Furthermore, there may be no property or insufficient property outside the trust to compensate 
the applicant.63 The repeal of gift duty has removed the need to structure the settlement of trusts as a 
  
57  Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill 1998 (109-1) (select committee report) at xii.  
58  Property (Relationships) Act, s 44C(2)(a). 
59  Property (Relationships) Act, ss 44C(2)(c) and 44C(3)(a). 
60  Property (Relationships) Act, s 44C(3)(b). 
61  Bourneville v Bourneville [2008] NZCA 520, [2009] NZFLR 69; and JEF v GJO [2012] NZHC 1021. 
62  Genc v Genc (2006) 26 FRNZ 67 (HC); and Strauss v Turner [2014] NZHC 661. 
63  For example in Ward v Ward FC Hastings FAM-2004-020-116, 20 April 2007 the debt back to the spouses 
was partially forgiven and the value of the property transferred into trust had risen considerably since it was 
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sale with a gradual forgiveness of the debt back.64 Property owners can now fully divest themselves 
of property in one go. While the court may order the trustees to pay income to the applicant in the 
absence of property outside to trust,65 the trust may not produce an income, or insufficient income, 
to compensate the applicant within a reasonable time frame.66  
The PRA remedies are thus of limited use in redressing the adverse effects of trusts on the 
relationship property entitlement of spouses or partners. 
B  Section 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 
Section 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA) dates back to s 37 of the Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1867, when the court was first given the power to make orders in respect of 
nuptial settlements in proceedings ancillary to divorce proceedings. Those were the days of 
matrimonial unity, marriage settlements and fault-based divorce. Although much has changed since 
then, the power to make orders in respect of nuptial settlements on divorce has been retained. 
Section 182 can be invoked on the dissolution of a marriage or civil union. It is not available when a 
de facto relationship ends.  
Although s 182 deals with property on the dissolution of a marriage or civil union, it is not part 
of the PRA and the presumption of equal sharing therefore does not apply.67 Section 182 serves a 
different purpose from ss 44 and 44C in the PRA.68 Whereas the PRA remedies are aimed at 
restoring the applicant's relationship property entitlement, s 182 is concerned with the applicant's 
provision from a nuptial settlement, which may not include assets produced by the couple.69  
Section 182 involves a two stage process.70 The first stage is to determine whether the trust in 
question is a nuptial settlement. The second stage is to assess whether and, if so, how the court's 
discretion under s 182 should be exercised.71 For a trust to qualify as a nuptial settlement, it must 
  
settled on trust. As the trust did not produce sufficient income, Mrs Ward applied for an order under s 182 
of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
64  Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Act 2011, s 245. 
65  Property (Relationships) Act, s 44C(3); and Greig v Hutchison [2015] NZHC 1309, [2015] NZFLR 587. 
66  As in Ward v Ward, above n 63. 
67  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [65], agreeing on this point with the Court's earlier decision in Ward v Ward 
[2009] NZSC 125, [2010] 2 NZLR 31 at [20]. 
68  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [98]. 
69  At [61]–[64]. 
70  At [27]. 
71  The lower courts in Clayton v Clayton had wrongly conflated the two stages when dealing with the 
Claymark Trust, concluding that the trust was a business trust from which Mrs Clayton did not expect to 
derive a benefit: Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [30]. 
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make some ongoing provision for one or both of the parties to a marriage or civil union in their 
capacity as spouses or civil union partners, with or without provision for their children.72 In its 
separate judgment in Clayton v Clayton on the Claymark Trust (Clayton CT), the Supreme Court 
held that a settlement for the parties "in their capacity as spouses" merely required there to be a 
connection or proximity between the settlement and the marriage. 73 That connection is almost 
inevitable where there is a family trust settled during the currency of a marriage with either or both 
parties to the marriage being beneficiaries, as was the case in both Ward v Ward and the Claymark 
Trust in Clayton CT.74  
The Supreme Court went on to say that the relevant connection might even exist where the trust 
was settled by a third party with a significant number of other beneficiaries, apart from the parties to 
the marriage, or where the trust was settled long before the marriage and a future spouse is listed as 
a potential beneficiary but no particular spouse is in contemplation at the time of settlement.75 This 
view reflects the reasoning of Kiefel J in Kennon v Spry,76 a decision of the High Court of Australia, 
which a full bench of the High Court of New Zealand declined to follow in Kidd v van den Brink.77 
The Supreme Court expressed its view with appropriate caution, which suggests that the required 
connection should not be remote or tangential. Nonetheless, these dicta pave the way for a wider 
meaning of nuptial settlement than has previously been accepted. Trusts may therefore be a great 
deal more vulnerable to orders under s 182, regardless of who settled the trust or the source of the 
assets.  
Once jurisdiction is established, the court's discretion is at large. It can make such orders with 
respect to the settlement as it thinks fit. Section 182 provides no criteria or guidance on how the 
discretion is to be exercised. When the provision was first introduced in 1867, the discretion was 
commonly used to prevent the guilty spouse from continuing to benefit from the nuptial settlement. 
Since the abolition of fault based divorce, s 182 has been used to provide some ongoing benefit for 
the applicant spouse.78  
In Clayton CT the Supreme Court held that the starting point is that nuptial settlements are 
premised on the continuation of the marriage. If that premise ceases to apply and the applicant is no 
  
72  At [33]; and Ward v Ward, above n 67, at [27]. 
73  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [34]. 
74  Ward v Ward, above n 67, at [28]; and Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [39]–[42]. The Supreme Court 
overruled the lower courts' decisions that the Claymark Trust was not a nuptial settlement. 
75  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [35]–[36].  
76  Kennon v Spry, above n 46, at [228]–[230]. 
77  Kidd v van den Brink HC Auckland, CIV-2009-404-4694, 21 December 2009 at [23].  
78  For example Chrystall v Chrystall [1993] NZFLR 772 (FC). 
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longer able to benefit from the settlement, a fundamental change has come about that might 
necessitate a review of the settlement.79  
"The purpose of the discretion is to remedy the consequences of the failure of the premise of a 
continuing marriage."80  To that end the applicant's likely position under the settlement if the 
marriage had continued must be compared to the applicant's likely position in respect of the 
settlement after dissolution of the marriage. The comparison is forward looking, not backward 
looking to the time of settlement, and takes into account all relevant circumstances.81  
Factors relevant to the exercise of discretion include the terms of the settlement and how the 
trustees are likely to exercise their powers, the wider benefits to the family unit that the trust has 
provided or might have been expected to provide, the source and character of the assets, taking into 
account the current social context that parties to a marriage contribute in different but equal ways to 
the marriage and accumulation of assets. 82  The interests of children, particularly dependent 
children, are a primary consideration.83 Indeed, orders can be made in their favour.84 The parties' 
subjective expectations of the settlement may be relevant, but are not determinative.85  
Had Mr and Mrs Clayton not settled their claim, the Supreme Court would have exercised its 
discretion in Mrs Clayton's favour.86 She was benefiting directly from the trust and indirectly by 
distributions for the children's support. There was also the possibility of the Trustees exercising their 
discretion to make distributions to her in the future and she would have continued to enjoy the 
benefits that the Trust conferred on the family as a whole as well as the financial support it provided 
to the sawmilling business that generated income for the family. As the assets in the trust had been 
acquired during the marriage, the Court would have ordered that the Claymark Trust be split into 
two equal trusts, as it did in Ward v Ward.87  
  
79  Ward v Ward, above n 67, at [15]; and Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [50]. 
80  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [50]. 
81  At [50]. This formulation of the test differs from the test in Ward v Ward, above n 67, at [25] which focused 
on the parties' reasonable expectations of the settlement at the time it was made. Although that test was 
expressed in general terms, it was intended to describe the application of s 182 to the circumstances in 
Ward: Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [47]–[52] per Glazebrook J and at [99] per Elias CJ. 
82  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [57]–[68]. 
83  At [67]. 
84  Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182(1). 
85  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [48]. This is in contrast to how the Supreme Court ruling in Ward v Ward, 
above n 67, was construed. See n 81 above. 
86  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [75]–[84]. 
87  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6, at [83]. 
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While the applicants in Clayton CT and Ward v Ward were eventually successful in their 
application under s 182, the jurisdictional requirements may prevent other applicants from invoking 
the provision, notwithstanding the wider meaning of nuptial settlement suggested by the Supreme 
Court. Besides, it is still not available to de facto partners. Section 182 thus has its limitations. 
III  NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION PROPOSED REFORMS 
A Reforms to s 44C PRA and s 182 FPA 
The Law Commission reviewed the Law of Trusts between 2009 and 2013. As part of this 
Review it produced five Issues Papers,88 a Preferred Approach Paper,89 and a final Report, entitled 
Review of the Law of Trusts – A Trusts Act for New Zealand.90 The Commission's approach to this 
review was to focus on core matters of trust law, rather than the interface between trusts and other 
policy areas. It made an exception in regard to relationship property, because many submitters had 
singled out ss 44 and 44C of the PRA as inadequate remedies to ensure a just division of assets 
produced or enhanced by the relationship.91 To meet at least some of those concerns, the Law 
Commission recommended amending s 44C PRA and s 182 FPA. 
The Law Commission recommended that s 44C PRA be amended to give the court power to 
make an order requiring the trustees of the trust to pay to one spouse or partner a specified sum of 
money or transfer property from the trust to compensate the partner whose rights were defeated by 
the disposition of relationship property to the trust. Section 44C would otherwise remain unchanged. 
The jurisdictional requirements would continue to provide only a narrow gateway into the 
compensation power and the change of circumstance defence for beneficiaries of the trust and the 
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion in s 44C(4) would still apply. Consistent with previous 
amendments to the PRA,92 the amendment would apply to existing relationships from the date that 
the amendment came into force, other than those relationships where the hearing of proceedings had 
already commenced.93 The power would therefore apply to dispositions of relationship property 
made before and after the amendment came into effect.  
  
88  Law Commission Review of Trust Law in New Zealand: Introductory Issues Paper (NZLC IP19, 2010); 
NZLC IP10, above n 1; Law Commission Perpetuities, Revocation and the Variation of Trusts: Review of 
the Law of Trusts Third Issues Paper (NZLC IP22, 2011); Law Commission The Duties, Office and Powers 
of a Trustee: Review of the Law of Trusts Fourth Issues Paper (NZLC IP26, 2011); and Law Commission 
Court Jurisdiction, Trading Trusts and Other Issues: Review of the Law of Trusts Fifth Issue Paper (NZLC 
IP 28, 2011). 
89  Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts: Preferred Approach (NZLC IP31, 2012). 
90  NZLC R130, above n 7. 
91  NZLC IP31, above n 89, at [17.2]; and NZLC R130, above n 7 at [19.1]. 
92  Property (Relationships) Act, ss 4C, 10A–10D, 55, and 96–99. 
93  NZLC R130, above n 7, at [19.29]. 
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In regard to s 182 FPA, the Law Commission recommended that it be amended to apply to de 
facto relationships as well.94 The triggering event for all relationships should be factual separation, 
rather than legal dissolution, and the reference to nuptial settlement should be changed to 
relationship settlement. This amendment would remove the discrimination against de facto 
relationships as well as the need for spouses and civil union partners to wait two years for a formal 
dissolution of their legal bond.95  
The amendments to s 44C PRA and s 182 FPA should apply to all relationships existing at the 
time that the amendments come into effect or commencing thereafter, unless proceedings had 
commenced at the time that the amendments came into force.96 
B  Problems with the Law Commission's Proposed Reforms 
Problems with the Law Commission's proposed reforms are best explained by reference to three 
typical types of family trust.  
(1) The Couple's Trust was settled by Conrad and Claire during their relationship with 
relationship property and an inheritance from Conrad's father, which is Conrad's separate 
property. The Trust was settled for sound asset protection reasons, but not to deprive either 
partner of their enjoyment of the property. Section 44 PRA is therefore not in play. 
(2) The Single's Trust was settled by Simon years before he met and married Sally. The 
purpose of the Trust was to preserve the property from a former relationship for his 
children and for asset protection reasons. The assets transferred into trust were Simon's 
separate property, but include a house that on marriage to Sally becomes their family home 
and property that increases in value in part as a result of Sally's direct and indirect actions.  
(3) The Parents' Trust is settled by Grant's parents for the benefit of their children and 
grandchildren as part of a succession plan. The partners of the children and grandchildren 
are included in the class of discretionary beneficiaries. The Trust's major asset is a farm 
with housing for each of the children and their families. Years after the Trust was 
established, Grant marries Gwen. They live and work on the farm and raise their children 
there. 
After ten years each of the couples separates. Conrad, Simon and Grant continue to live in the 
family home and benefit from the trust, while Claire, Sally and Gwen move into rented 
accommodation and receive no support from the trust. The women lodge proceedings seeking orders 
under s 44C PRA and s 182 FPA, as amended in accordance with the Law Commission's proposals. 
  
94  At [19.38]. 
95  Family Proceedings Act, s 39. 
96  NZLC R130, above n 7, at [19.29] and [19.45]. 
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1 Section 44C PRA 
The proposed amendment to s 44C would assist Claire, but only in regard to the disposition of 
relationship property. She would meet the other jurisdictional requirements in regard to such 
dispositions. The disposition has the effect of defeating her rights under the PRA. But for the Trust, 
she would have shared equally in that property.97 If Conrad has no property outside the Couple's 
Trust, the court could compensate Claire by making orders against the trustees to pay her up to half 
the current value of the relationship property transferred into the Couple's Trust.  
No order under s 44C could be made in respect of Conrad's inheritance transferred into trust. 
But if relationship property had subsequently been applied to the inherited property, Claire would be 
entitled to claim compensation for the current value of those dispositions of relationship property. 
She should also be able to claim compensation for any increase in value of the inherited property 
attributable to the application of those dispositions of relationship property. But for those 
dispositions into trust, the relationship property could have been invested in some other equally 
lucrative venture in which she would have shared equally. The dispositions thus defeat her rights to 
share in the increased value of Conrad's inheritance. Whether she could use s 44C to claim 
compensation for an increase in value attributable to her direct or indirect actions is less clear. Her 
actions are contributions to property, rather than dispositions of property. However, in view of the 
wide meanings given to "disposition" and "property", it is arguable that her actions constitute 
dispositions of relationship property, at least in the context of the PRA.98 
If the court decided to award compensation by ordering the trustees of the Couple's Trust to pay 
Claire a capital sum or transfer property to her, she would be receiving the money or property free 
from the constraints of the Couple's Trust, while Conrad would continue to be bound by the Trust. 
Section 44C does not provide for resettlement of the trust. An order vesting capital or property in 
Claire would therefore not achieve the intended equality of benefit as between the spouses.  
At a more fundamental level, the effect of a compensation order removing property from the 
trust is to reverse a prior alienation. One of the core elements of a trust is the alienation of the 
settlor's personal estate to the beneficiaries of the trust. Claire and Conrad are free to alienate their 
assets to a trust,99 and they would usually have done so after receiving legal advice about the effect 
and implications of settling a trust.100 In New Zealand trusts are normally not revocable, because 
that defeats the settlor's intention of divesting himself or herself of property. Settlors intend their 
  
97  Nation v Nation, above n 2, at [146]. 
98  Re Polkinghorne Trust, above n 53, at 640, held that "disposition" means all forms of alienation, whether 
for value or not. Clayton VPRT (SC), above n 5, construed "property" purposively and contextually. 
99  Property (Relationships) Act, s 19. 
100  Independent legal advice is seen as good practice, but it is not a legal requirement. 
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disposition to be a permanent alienation. Yet, the effect of a compensation claim under s 44C would 
be to revoke up to half the settlement. The disposition of relationship property is therefore not safe 
and the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust cannot be confident that the trust property will remain 
intact. Commercial certainty and the interests of beneficiaries are thus jeopardised. 101  Even 
distributions to beneficiaries made in accordance with the terms of the trust may not be safe from 
recovery. The recipient beneficiaries risk losing some or all of the distribution if they are unable to 
show that they had altered their position in reliance on the distribution and that it would be unjust to 
make an order that would disturb that distribution.102  
The Single's and Parents' Trusts are less vulnerable to a s 44C claim. Sally and Gwen would not 
meet the jurisdictional requirements, at least not in regard to the initial transfers of property. In 
Sally's case, the property was transferred into trust before Simon and Sally commenced their 
relationship and the assets were his separate property at the time of the transfer. In Gwen's case the 
dispositions were made by Grant's parents, not by Grant, and the assets came from his parents. 
However, if the couples had subsequently used relationship property to increase the value of the 
trust assets, those contributions would meet the jurisdictional requirements and allow the court to 
make orders removing capital from the trusts. The same arguments made in relation to the increase 
in value of the Couple's Trust could be made in relation to the Single's Trust and even the Parents' 
Trust. The risk to commercial certainty and the interests of other beneficiaries is even greater in 
these Trusts than in the Couple's Trust. Removing capital from the Single's Trust and the Parents' 
Trust also undermines the legitimate purposes for which these trusts were created. 
2 Section 182 FPA 
Claire could also apply for an order under s 182 FPA. The Couple's Trust fits the conventional 
understanding of a nuptial settlement. It was settled during the marriage to provide for Claire and 
Conrad and their children by virtue of their marriage.103 The court could therefore exercise its 
discretion in favour of Claire and would not be constrained by the difficulties associated with s 
44C's jurisdictional limitations. Under s 182 the court's concern is not to compensate for loss of 
relationship property, but rather to secure ongoing benefit from the nuptial settlement in the best 
way possible. It may do so by resettling some of the trust property on Claire or vesting capital in 
Claire, if that is more appropriate in the circumstances. As the trust included Conrad's inheritance, 
  
101  Official Assignee v Wilson, above n 22 at [52], where the Court of Appeal set a high threshold for finding a 
sham to protect commercial certainty and the interests of beneficiaries. Certainty of property interests 
benefits society and economic prosperity: see Emily Chamlee-Wright (ed) The Annual Proceedings of the 
Wealth and Well-Being of Nations, 2009–2010 (Beloit College Press, Beloit (Wisconsin), 2010) where 
Hernando de Soto's work on economic property theory is discussed. He coined the phrase "dead capital" to 
describe property that is unproductive because it is held in defective forms. 
102  Property (Relationships) Act, s 44C(3). 
103  Clayton CT (SC), above n 6. 
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the court may leave Conrad with a larger share of the property. However, if the inheritance was 
small or if it had been benefiting Claire as well, directly or indirectly, the court may favour equality.  
Whether the Single's Trust and the Parents' Trust are nuptial settlements is less clear. Case law 
preceding the Supreme Court decisions in Clayton v Clayton would have ruled against these trusts 
being nuptial settlements.104 Neither Trust was settled to provide for a particular marriage. But 
Clayton v Clayton leaves room for argument that a sufficient connection between the trust and the 
marriage can be established for the trusts to qualify as nuptial settlements. If so, orders could be 
made that would significantly interfere with the purpose of these trusts, and the legitimate 
expectations of the settlors and beneficiaries. That risk is mitigated if the nuptial element is 
construed to require a genuine connection between the trust and the relationship from which it can 
be clearly inferred that the trust was intended to make provision for the couple in question, even if 
the identity of the spouse or partner was not known at the time of settlement. 
If s 182 is amended as proposed by the Law Commission, it provides a more appropriate means 
of dealing with trusts when a relationship ends than s 44C does. Unlike s 44C, s 182 applies only if 
the trust was intended to provide for the couple. There should therefore be no surprise if the court 
makes orders that ensure that premise is maintained, albeit in a different form. Section 182 respects 
the trust, whereas s 44C does not. The interests of children are also at the forefront of s 182, whereas 
under s 44C those interests are incidental. There are therefore good reasons to favour the Law 
Commission's proposed amendment to s 182 and to oppose its amendment of s 44C. 
IV  FURTHER OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
The forthcoming review of the PRA may recommend more radical reform to empower the 
courts to make orders against trustees in any circumstances where the trust holds property that 
would be relationship property but for the trust. Claire would be entitled to compensation for any 
increase in value in Conrad's separate property that was attributable to her actions and Sally and 
Gwen could claim compensation from the Single's Trust and Parents' Trust for the loss of their half 
share of the family home and any increase in value of other property that was attributable to their 
actions or the application of relationship property. Logically they should also be entitled to 
compensation for any other claims they would have had if the assets had not been in trust, such as 
compensation for sustaining the other party's separate property and for economic disparity.105 Such 
a change would give the court the power to ignore the substance of the trust and prioritise a party's 
relationship property entitlement over the trust.  
The adverse consequences would not be confined to trusts settled by a couple during their 
relationship. Simon might safeguard the trust assets in the Single's Trust from claims by Sally by 
  
104  Kidd v van den Brink, above n 77. See also Brooks v Brooks [1996] 1 AC 375 (HL). 
105  Property (Relationships) Act, ss 15, 15A and 17. 
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entering into an agreement prior to or at the start of their relationship to contract out of the PRA and 
clarify Sally's rights in relation to the trust assets.106 Sally would no doubt be advised against 
signing such a contract, as she would be forfeiting a relationship property entitlement. Even if she 
did sign the contract, it may eventually be set aside on grounds of serious injustice.107 That is even 
more likely if Conrad and Claire contracted out of the PRA, as they had already acquired 
relationship property rights when they transferred their assets into trust. 108  Contracting out 
agreements are no guarantee that the assets will remain safe from a PRA claim.  
Contracting out of the PRA is more difficult for Grant, because his parents settled the trust and 
he is merely a discretionary beneficiary of the Parents' Trust. Any claim that Gwen might make 
would be against the trustees of the Parents' Trust and would not necessarily involve Grant at all. 
The trustees of the Parents' Trust have no standing under the PRA to contract out of its provisions. 
Only spouses and partners, or persons contemplating entering into a marriage, civil union or de 
facto relationship, have the right under s 21 to contract out of the PRA. The Parents' Trust would 
therefore be vulnerable to a PRA claim from Grant's former wife and have no means of 
safeguarding the trust against her claim.  
There is a tension between giving effect to the social objectives of a statutory property sharing 
regime when a relationship ends and upholding the right to private property and thus the right of 
property owners to deal with their property as they wish. The PRA allows spouses and partners to 
deal freely with their assets during their relationship, including alienating them to third parties. It 
has been respectful of such alienations, unless they were made to defeat the relationship property 
rights of a spouse or partner. Even the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Clayton VRPT that 
treats powers in relation to a trust as property does not interfere with the alienation of the assets. 
That sort of constraint is common in other statutes protecting vulnerable persons, such as 
creditors. 109  Even if the disposition was made with fraudulent intent, the property cannot 
necessarily be recovered if the transferees received the assets for value and in good faith or if they 
did not provide value but altered their circumstances in the bona fide belief that the alienation was 
properly made.110  
The objective of the PRA is to distribute property owned by each of the parties between the 
parties. While the meaning of property may be construed widely to capture rights and interests that 
would not in other contexts constitute property, the scope of the PRA is confined to property owned 
  
106  Section 21. 
107  Section 21J. 
108  Harrison v Harrison, above n 29. 
109  See for example Property Law Act 2007; and Insolvency Act 2006. 
110  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 44(2); Property Law Act 2007, s 349(2); and Insolvency Act 2006, s 
208. 
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by each party to the relationship on separation or death. Section 44C is the first exception to that 
confined scope. For good reason the exception has strict boundaries, both in terms of its jurisdiction 
and the compensation order that the court is empowered to make against trustees. The Law 
Commission's proposed amendment to s 44C goes much further. It allows the court to remove 
capital from the trust, thereby according greater priority to the relationship property entitlement over 
the interests of beneficiaries of the trust. When deciding whether to order compensation, the court is 
not directed to consider the interests of other beneficiaries, such as children of a former relationship 
or a parent or sibling of the spouse or partner. While their interests might be considered as part of 
"any other relevant matter", their omission suggests a disregard for beneficiaries other than the 
spouse or partner of the relationship. If Parliament decides to relax the jurisdictional requirements of 
s 44C, the detriment to the trust and its beneficiaries will be even greater.  
The Law Commission's proposed amendment to s 182 FPA is less problematic, provided the 
term "nuptial settlement" is not construed too widely. It respects the trust, the premise on which the 
trust was settled and the trust's other beneficiaries. It is nonetheless a remedy affecting property 
triggered by the ending of a relationship. There is merit in the criticism that s 182 should be 
repealed because the PRA is intended to be a complete code governing property division when a 
relationship ends. The relationship between s 182 and the PRA and whether s 182 should be 
retained are questions that the Law Commission has been asked to consider as part of its review of 
the PRA.111 
In my view, there are good reasons to retain s 182 as a separate provision, not as part of the 
PRA. It acknowledges that the property is not beneficially owned by the parties to the relationship 
and, hence, should not be governed by the same principles that underpin a statute that governs 
distribution of property beneficially owned by the parties to the relationship. The subject matter of a 
nuptial or relationship settlement may not have been produced by the parties to the relationship. The 
settlement may have been made by the parents of a spouse or partner to provide for the couple. 
While such settlements may now be less common, it would be a mistake to presume that they did 
not occur at all. Parents commonly support their children in a variety of ways and, with the present 
high cost of housing, such support may become more common and be best provided by means of a 
trust. In today's climate, there may also be a reversal of roles. As parents live longer and re-partner 
later in life, children may be supporting their parents through settlements. Such settlements do not 
readily fit with the purpose and principles of the PRA, but some variation may nonetheless be 
required when the relationship they were intended to provide for ends. If s 182 is retained as a 
separate provision, the inclusion of criteria would provide guidance for the court in the exercise of 
its discretion and certainty for settlors and beneficiaries as to the reliability of their settlements. 
  
111  See the terms of reference in "Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976" (24 May 2016) Law 
Commission <www.lawcom.govt.nz>.  
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V  CONCLUSION 
This article sought to outline some of the practical and conceptual difficulties in providing 
remedies against the capital of a trust to ensure that a disadvantaged spouse or partner is able to 
secure a just division of the fruits of the partnership. I have argued against amending the PRA to 
provide for orders against the capital of a trust in the absence of an intention to defeat the rights of a 
spouse or partner. I favour retaining s 182 FPA as a separate provision and making it available on 
separation and to de facto partners, provided it is applied only to trusts that were settled to make 
provision for a particular relationship. In my view that amendment strikes an appropriate balance 
between property rights following the breakdown of a relationship and respect for trusts and private 
property generally. 
The arguments I have expressed may seem conservative, anti-equality, and out of step with 
international developments where orders in respect of trusts are well established. I believe the 
arguments are nonetheless worth making, because any order that a court makes against trustees 
necessarily affects the rights and interests of third parties, some or many of whom may not be part 
of the nuclear family of the former couple. In deciding what powers to grant to the court in respect 
of trusts holding assets produced by the former partnership the rights of third parties must not be 
ignored.  
The purpose of this article was to explore the impact that prioritising relationship property 
entitlements would have on trusts, the interests of beneficiaries and commercial certainty. Deciding 
where to strike the balance between these competing interests is a policy decision for Parliament. 
Wherever that balance is struck, there is likely to be dissatisfaction, but at least it will have been 
made as part of a democratic process, rather than through judicial rulings made without the benefit 
of argument as to the wider ramifications of such rulings.  
